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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
    
      nited States extraterritorial drone and special operations continue to 
generate international and domestic controversy.1 Much of the debate sur-
rounds the legality of crossing State borders to conduct the missions. Alt-
hough commentators sometimes look to international humanitarian law 
                                                                                                                      
* Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law and Chairman, International 
Law Department, United States Naval War College; Professor of Public International Law, 
University of Exeter. The views expressed in this article are those of the author in his per-
sonal capacity and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. government. The article is 
republished with permission from the Military Law and the Law of War Review and was part 
of a symposium honoring my friend, the late Brigadier General Erwin Dahinden, Swiss 
Army. 
1. See, e.g., the recent reports on drone operations. Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, U.N. 
Doc. A/68/382 (Sept. 13, 2013) (by Christopher Heyns); Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terror-
ism, transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/68/389 (Sept. 18, 2013) (by Ben 
Emmerson); “Will I be Next?”: US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 
(Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/will-i-be-next-us-drone-
strikes-in-pakistan; “Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda”: The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in 
Yemen, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/ 
10/22/between-drone-and-al-qaeda. 
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(IHL) as the source of authority for transborder operations, the existence 
of an armed conflict in which IHL applies generally has no bearing on the 
extraterritoriality question. As has been discussed elsewhere, the primary 
international law bases for extraterritorial operations are instead consent 
and self-defense—aspects of the jus ad bellum, not the jus in bello.2 
However, the existence of an armed conflict does fix the legal regime 
that controls how extraterritorial operations have to be conducted.3 The 
fundamental legal question in this regard is whether the lex generalis of in-
ternational human rights law (IHRL) or the lex specialis of IHL binds a 
State’s extraterritorial application of force. The difference between the two 
distinct bodies of law is crucial. To the extent IHL applies, individuals may 
be targeted based on status as members of the armed forces (including as 
members of organized armed groups) or as civilians directly participating in 
hostilities.4 Should it not apply, IHRL norms restrict lethal targeting to sit-
uations in which its use is “strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.”5 
Moreover, the IHL rules governing detention are less restrictive than their 
IHRL counterparts and the application of IHL opens the door to prosecu-
tion for war crimes.6 Finally, IHRL generally applies only to the operations 
of State forces, thereby leaving the activities of non-State armed groups 
                                                                                                                      
2. Michael N. Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting: Deconstructing the Logic of Interna-
tional Law, 52 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW __ (forthcoming 2013). 
3. On the range of extraterritorial operations to which IHL might be applicable, see 
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS, Report Prepared for the 
31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 31IC/11/5.1.2, 9–11 
(Oct. 2011) [hereinafter ICRC 31st Conference Report]. See also Jelena Pejic, The Protective 
Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye, 93 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED 
CROSS 189, 193–97 (2011). 
4. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON 
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW 21–22 (Nils Melzer ed., 2009); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts art. 51(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol 
I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts art. 13(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. 
5. Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Fire-
arms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, at 112, 114 (1990).  
6. ICRC 31st Conference Report, supra note 3, at 10. 
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subject solely to prohibitions set forth in domestic legal regimes.7 IHL, by 
contrast, binds all parties to a conflict. 
This article examines the geographical reach of IHL during an armed 
conflict between a State and a non-State organized armed group.8 Its pur-
pose is to explore how location affects the applicability of the differing le-
gal regimes. Discussion will focus predominantly on non-international 
armed conflict (NIAC), for that genre of hostilities poses the greatest in-
terpretive conundrums. It is an inquiry of momentous practical importance 
since IHL’s range (or lack thereof) influences operational planning and 
mission execution, determines how civilians and civilian objects must be 
protected during hostilities, sets the applicable detention regime, and af-
fords avenues for enforcement of norms that are not otherwise available.  
 
II. THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
 
Before turning to non-international armed conflict, it is useful to briefly 
detour into the geography of international conflict.9 There are two condi-
tions precedent to the existence of an international armed conflict (IAC). 
First, the parties to the conflict must be States. This requirement is clear 
from the text of Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
which provides that the Conventions “apply to all cases of declared war or 
of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of 
                                                                                                                      
7. For a survey of the differences between IHL and IHRL, see id. at 13–20.   
8. See also Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate 
Whether There is a “Legal Geography of War,” in FUTURE CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL SECU-
RITY AND LAW (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2011), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/ 
documents/FutureChallenges_Anderson.pdf; Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battle-
field: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 UNIVERSITY 
OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1165 (2013); Sasha Radin, Global Armed Conflict? The 
Threshold of Extraterritorial Non-International Armed Conflict, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUD-
IES 696 (2013); Claus Kress, Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework Governing 
Transnational Armed Conflicts, 15 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 245 (2010); 
Louise Arimatsu, Territory, Boundaries and the Law of Armed Conflict, 12 YEARBOOK OF IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 157 (2009); Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed Conflicts in 
International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INTERNATIONAL RE-
VIEW OF THE RED CROSS 69 (2009). 
9. For a concise discussion of qualification as an IAC, see Jelena Pejic, Status of Armed 
Conflicts, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW 77, 80–84 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007). 
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them.”10 The 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 
adopts the same formulation by reference.11 Although Common Article 2 is 
treaty law, and while key certain States, including the United States, are not 
party to Additional Protocol I, the State-on-State construct for internation-
al armed conflict is universally seen as reflecting customary international 
law. For instance, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the United States Supreme Court 
adopted the approach when it distinguished conflicts that are “not of an 
international character” from “a clash between nations.”12 Note that a con-
flict between a non-State group and a State may sometimes qualify as inter-
national, but only when another State exercises “overall control” of the 
group such that the conflict is at its heart between the two States.13 
The second condition precedent, that the conflict be “armed,” also de-
rives from the text of Article 2. The celebrated Pictet Commentary to the 
provision states,  
 
[a]ny difference arising between two States and leading to the inter-
vention of armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 
2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of the state of war. It 
makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter 
takes place.14  
 
Similarly, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Com-
mentary to the companion Additional Protocol I provision provides, 
“[n]either the duration of the conflict, nor its intensity, play a role” in quali-
                                                                                                                      
10. Only States may become party to the Conventions. Convention (I) for the Ame-
lioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (emphasis added) [hereinaf-
ter Geneva Conventions I–IV].  
11. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 1(3). 
12. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 777 (2006).  
13. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 145 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). See also Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 211 (Mar. 14, 2012). The International Court of 
Justice cited the standard with approval in its Bosnian Genocide judgment. Application of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & 
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 108, ¶¶ 403–05 (Feb. 26). 
14. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF 
PRISONERS OF WAR 23 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960) (emphasis added).  
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fication as an armed conflict.15 While publicists do not universally agree 
with the purported lack of intensity or duration criteria,16 the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) has adopted the approach.17 In 
the author’s view, this understanding comports fully with the object and 
purpose of IHL and therefore represents a reasonable interpretation of the 
law. 
The geographical scope of an IAC is relatively well settled; IHL applies 
throughout the territory of States party to the conflict, as well as interna-
tional waters and airspace.18 There is no requirement that hostilities occur 
in the area in which the law is to be applied. The law of neutrality has also 
long permitted belligerents to also conduct operations on neutral territory, 
albeit in extremely limited circumstances. Neutral States shoulder an obliga-
tion to ensure belligerents do not operate from their territory.19 Should a 
neutral State fail to comply with this duty, either because it will not or can-
not, the opposing belligerent may lawfully cross into neutral territory for 
the sole purpose of putting an end to its enemy’s activities.20  
Although it has been suggested that a parallel rule applies during NI-
ACs,21 neither State practice nor opinio juris supports such an expansion. To 
the extent the logic (vice law) of the neutrality framework applies analo-
gously outside the context of a classic IAC, it does so only as an aspect of 
the jus ad bellum in the form of what has become known as the “unwillingly 
                                                                                                                      
15. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUGUST 12 1949, ¶ 62 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1988). 
16. For somewhat more nuanced analysis, see, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AG-
GRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 11–12 (5th ed. 2005); Christopher Greenwood, Scope of 
Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 37, 48 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2009).  
17. “[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to force by States.” Prose-
cutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).  
18. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 13.6 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL]. 
19. Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons 
in Case of War on Land art. 5, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310.  
20. U.S. NAVY/U.S. MARINE CORPS/U.S. COAST GUARD, THE COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-
12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, ¶ 7.3 (2007); UK MANUAL, supra note 18, ¶ 1.43. The activ-
ity would be governed by IHL. 
21. Karl S. Chang, Enemy Status and Military Detention in the War Against Al-Qaeda, 47 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 1 (2011). But see Rebecca Ingber, Untangling Belliger-
ency from Neutrality in the Conflict with Al-Qaeda, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 
75 (2011). 
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or unable” test.22 Thus, while a State embroiled in a NIAC may sometimes 
cross borders into other States (arguably including those that are distant) to 
take the fight to its enemy pursuant to jus ad bellum norms, it may not do so 
based solely on the fact that it is engaged in an armed conflict. 
The aforementioned benchmarks for qualifying a conflict as interna-
tional are useful to bear in mind when considering the reach of IHL during 
a NIAC. In particular, note that 1) the existence of an IAC depends pri-
marily on the nature of the parties involved, and 2) the intensity, or lack 
thereof, of the hostilities in any specified locale during an IAC does not 
determine application of IHL there. As will be explained, the preferred 
view of the legal geography of NIAC adopts a comparable approach, one 
focusing on parties rather than intensity of combat at any particular place.  
 
III. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO A NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED  
CONFLICT 
 
Building on the definition of international conflict set forth in Common 
Article 2, Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions defines NI-
ACs as those that are “not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”23 This binary approach 
(those conflicts that are international and those that are not) is reflected in, 
                                                                                                                      
22. Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting, supra note 2; Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or 
Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VIRGINIA JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 483 (2012). For an early treatment of the issue, see Michael N. 
Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 513, 540–43 (2003). This is the position adopted by the United States. See, 
e.g., White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President at National De-
fense University, May 23, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/ 
23/remarks-president-national-defense-university; White House Office of the Press Secre-
tary, Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterter-
rorism Operations Outside the United States an Areas of Active Hostilities, May 23, 2013, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards 
-and-procedures-use-force-counterterrorism; U.S. Department of Justice White Paper, 
Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader 
of Al-Qa’ida or an Associated Force, Draft 1-2 (Nov. 8, 2011), http://msnbcmedia.msn.com 
/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf. 
23. Geneva Conventions I–IV, supra note 10, art. 3. The United States has accepted 
Common Article 3 as the definitional basis for non-international armed conflict. See, e.g., 
Commander’s Handbook, supra note 20, ¶ 5.1.2.2. For a concise discussion of qualification 
as a NIAC, see Pejic, Status of Armed Conflicts, supra note 9, at 85–89. 
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for instance, the Statute of the International Criminal Court and jurispru-
dence of international tribunals.24 
 The ICTY developed the notion of non-international conflict by 
describing it as “protracted armed violence between governmental authori-
ties and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”25 
This well-known pronouncement sets forth the two generally accepted cri-
teria for non-international armed conflict: organization and intensity. First, 
like IACs, the existence of a NIAC depends on the parties involved. As 
noted in Tadić, a NIAC must involve an organized armed group fighting 
either a State or another such group; it is this condition which most clearly 
distinguishes non-international from international armed conflicts. To qual-
ify, the group in question must evidence a particular level of organization 
(albeit not to the degree of the regular armed forces26), a requirement 
stemming from the reference to “Party” in Common Article 3.27 The suffi-
ciency of organization in any particular case is fact-specific28 and need not 
detain the analysis of legal geography. 
Second, the hostilities must reach a certain level of intensity to qualify 
as a NIAC.29 Article 1 of Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, which supplements the protections set forth in Common Article 
3, exemplifies this requirement by excluding “situations of internal disturb-
ances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and 
other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts” from its 
                                                                                                                      
24. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 619 (Sept. 2, 
1998); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, ¶ 90 (Dec. 6, 1999); 
Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR73, Decision on Appeal Against “Deci-
sion on Prosecution’s Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence,” ¶ 32 (May 
16, 2005) (separate opinion of Judge Robertson); Lubanga, supra note 13, ¶ 233; Prosecu-
tor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, 
¶ 229 (June 15, 2006). 
25. Tadić, Jurisdiction, supra note 17, ¶ 70. See also Rome Statute, supra note 24, art. 
8(2)(f). 
26. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 89, 94–129 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005).  
27. “In the case of armed conflict not of an international character . . . each Party to 
the conflict shall be bound to apply . . . .” Geneva Conventions I–IV, supra note 10, art. 3. 
28. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008). 
29. For illustrative factors that may bear on the sufficiency of the intensity in this re-
gard, see Limaj, supra note 26, ¶¶ 135–70; Haradinaj, supra note 28, ¶ 49. 
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reach.30 Although imbedded in a treaty to which a number of key States 
involved in such conflicts, including the United States and Israel, are not 
party, the formula has been generally accepted as reflecting customary in-
ternational law in all NIACs. This is confirmed by its replication in the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.31 
Additional Protocol II requires a higher degree of intensity than Com-
mon Article 3 and, unlike that article, expressly sets geographical limitations 
on its applicability.32 With respect to intensity, the organized armed groups 
in question must “exercise such control over a part of its territory as to en-
able them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement” Additional Protocol II.33 Moreover, the Protocol relates only 
to conflicts that “take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party be-
tween its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized 
armed groups.”34 As is apparent from the use of the word “its,” Additional 
Protocol II only applies when a State is involved (thereby excluding con-
flicts between organized armed groups) and only to conflicts occurring 
within that State.35 No such limits appear in Common Article 3, nor are they 
deemed applicable as a matter of customary law.  
 
IV. APPROACHES TO THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHY OF NON-INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT 
 
In is undisputed that a NIAC requires the participation of an armed group 
that is sufficiently organized and hostilities that rise to a particular level. 
Only when these preconditions have been met does IHL govern opera-
tions associated with the conflict. The question remains as to whether ge-
ography limits the reach of IHL with respect those activities. Several ap-
proaches to the issue have crystallized. 
 
                                                                                                                      
30. Additional Protocol II, supra note 4, art. 1(2). 
31. Rome Statute, supra note 24, art. 8(2)(d). See also, e.g., U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVO-
CATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER AND SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 15 
(2013).  
32. See discussion of this point in NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLINGS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 257–59 (2008). 
33. Additional Protocol II, supra note 4, art. 1(1). 
34. Id. 
35. See discussion in MICHAEL BOTHE , KARL JOSEF PARTSCH , & WALDEMAR A. 
SOLF , NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 
1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 626 (1982). 
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A. Operations Limited to the Territory of the State  
 
By the most restrictive approach to the geographical scope of non-
international armed conflict, IHL governs only those hostilities and other 
conflict related operations that take place within a State’s geopolitical bor-
ders. Support for this approach is found in a plain meaning interpretation 
of Common Article 3’s “in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
Parties” text. The phrase can plausibly be understood as referring to the 
territory of the State that is involved in the conflict, much as Additional 
Protocol II appears to make such a limitation explicit during conflicts to 
which it applies.36 Adopting this interpretation would mean that human 
rights law, as well as the domestic law of the respective territorial State, 
would govern any extraterritorial hostilities during a NIAC. 
Whether or not a State’s borders limit the applicability of IHL in a NI-
AC, it is clear that the law extends throughout the territory of the State in-
volved. In the Tadić jurisdiction decision, the ICTY addressed the issue of 
IHL’s application beyond the “hot battlefield,” that is, where hostilities of 
the requisite intensity are not taking place. It explained,  
 
The geographical and temporal frame of reference for internal armed 
conflicts is . . . broad. This conception is reflected in the fact that benefi-
ciaries of [C]ommon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions are those tak-
ing no active part (or no longer taking active part) in the hostilities. This 
indicates that the rules contained in Article 3 also apply outside the nar-
row geographical context of the actual theatre of combat operations. Sim-
ilarly, certain language in Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions . . . also 
suggests a broad scope. . . . [I]nternational humanitarian law continues to 
apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal 
conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not 
actual combat takes place there.37 
                                                                                                                      
36. The ICRC Commentaries to the provision might seem to support such a view in 
that they refer to a NIAC that takes place “within the confines of a single country.” COM-
MENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN 
PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 36 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958). But see Pejic, Protective Scope, supra note 
3, at 200–01; SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICT 231 (2012). 
37. Tadić, Jurisdiction, supra note 17, ¶¶ 69–70. See also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, 
Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 56–57 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 
64 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kordić and 
Čerkez, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, ¶ 319 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo-
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Two aspects of this finding are especially relevant to the issue of legal 
geography. On the one hand, the Tribunal clearly rejected any requirement 
that there be ongoing hostilities in the location where the IHL norms in 
question are to be applied. As noted in a later case, “there is no necessary 
correlation between the area where the actual fighting takes place and the 
geographical reach of the laws of war.” For the Tribunal, the key was 
whether the acts were “closely related” to the hostilities.38 This premise is 
especially pertinent with respect to the extraterritorial reach of IHL, dis-
cussed below.  
On the other hand, the Tribunal specifically limited its holding to terri-
tory in the control of a party to the conflict, thereby begging the question 
of whether it applies in a location over which neither party enjoys control. 
Limiting its reach would have the curious consequence that IHL would be 
inapplicable in disputed territory or in remote areas where neither side was 
significantly present or active. Given the broad approach to geographical 
scope advanced by the Tribunal, this aspect of the Court’s holding should 
be interpreted as merely signaling that IHL extends at least throughout the 
State’s entire territory. 
Even by a restrictive approach, the one circumstance in which IHL 
would apply beyond a State’s borders is when an external State becomes 
involved in the NIAC. In the event a NIAC is “internationalized” by virtue 
of an external State’s assistance to rebel forces (a topic beyond the scope of 
this article), the IAC rules regarding legal geography outlined above would 
come into play.39 Yet, when an external State supports government forces it 
can become a party to the NIAC. Simply providing some material assis-
tance or basic training would not have that effect any more than offering 
similar aid to non-State parties would internationalize the conflict. Partici-
pating in the hostilities that qualify the conflict as non-international, as in 
the case of U.S. military assistance to Yemen, would, however, make the 
assisting State a party to the conflict.40 By the Tadić approach, the applica-
                                                                                                                      
slavia Dec. 17, 2004); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, ¶ 367 
(May 15, 2003). 
38. Kunarać, supra note 37, at ¶ 57. See also Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, 
Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 177 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 
31, 2003). 
39. Dietrich Schindler, The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva Con-
ventions and Protocols, RECUEIL DES COURS 121, 150 (1979); DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 5–8; 
Pejic, Status of Armed Conflicts, supra note 9, at 89–92. 
40. Schindler, supra note 39, at 150; Pejic, Status of Armed Conflicts, supra note 9, at 92. 
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bility of IHL would therefore extend throughout its territory. Any opera-
tions therein would accordingly be governed by IHL, even if hostilities did 
not regularly occur there. This fact has enormous implications in light of, 
for instance, international support of Afghanistan in its NIAC with the Tal-
iban and associated armed groups.  
 
B. Spillover Conflicts  
 
The approach by which borders bound IHL has lost favor among States, 
scholars, and practitioners. In particular, there is growing acceptance of the 
proposition that IHL applies to “spillover” conflicts in which government 
armed forces penetrate the territory of a neighboring State in order to en-
gage organized armed groups operating in border areas.41 In support of this 
position, the ICRC argues that “spill over of a NIAC into adjacent territory 
cannot have the effect of absolving the parties of their IHL obligations 
simply because an international border has been crossed. The ensuing legal 
vacuum would deprive of protection both civilians possibly affected by the 
fighting, as well as persons who fall into enemy hands.”42 There is certainly 
State practice43 and scholarly support44 for this interpretation. Indeed, the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda extends to 
“serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the ter-
ritory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations 
committed in the territory of neighbouring States.”45 
Such an approach is fully consistent with Common Article 3’s reference 
                                                                                                                      
41. The issue of whether and when a spillover conflict results in a separate IAC be-
tween the penetrating State and the State into which the conflict has spilled over is inter-
esting, albeit beyond the scope of this article. However, the author takes the position that 
so long as the presence of foreign forces in the territory is lawful and no hostilities have 
occurred between those forces and forces of the territorial State, an IAC between those 
States has not been initiated. On the issue, see Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Con-
flicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CON-
FLICTS 32, 75–76 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012).  
42. ICRC 31st Conference Report, supra note 3, at 9–10. 
43. MELZER, supra note 32, at 259–60. 
44. The majority of the experts participating in the Chatham House classification of 
conflict project, including the author, concluded “conflicts involving the use of force by a 
State against a non-State group on the territory of another State are non-international 
armed conflicts where the force is directed solely at that non-State group.” Akande, supra 
note 41, at 72. 
45. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 1, S.C. Res. 955 an-
nex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, (Nov. 8, 1994) (emphasis added). See also id., art. 7. 
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to “one of” the parties, which can reasonably be read as extending the arti-
cle’s reach to hostilities occurring in the territory of any State party to the 
treaty, irrespective of whether that State is a party to the NIAC. Further, 
the Conventions are usually explicit when territoriality is a limiting factor 
(as it often is in those instruments), the paradigmatic example being the 
Fourth Geneva Convention’s provisions that are limited to occupied terri-
tory.46 That Common Article 3 contains no geographical limitation implies 
it was not intended to be so limited. It would also run counter to the object 
and purpose of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and especially Common 
Article 3, to adopt the more restrictive approach since a broad interpreta-
tion comports more closely with the Pictet Commentary’s view that “the arti-
cle should be applied as widely as possible.”47 
The logic of the spillover approach arguably justifies even broader ap-
plication. For instance, an organized armed group may seek sanctuary in a 
neighboring State because its territory is relatively ungoverned and, there-
fore, exploitable as a base of operations, or because the State is sympathetic 
and will not interfere with the group’s operations. Putting aside the sepa-
rate issues of whether penetrating the third State’s territory would be lawful 
and whether the operations might launch an IAC between the territorial 
State and the State taking the action, if the external State launched opera-
tions against the group that satisfied the intensity requirement, it would 
seem incongruent not to treat the situation in the same fashion as a spillo-
ver conflict. Although the hostilities may have not flowed across the bor-
der, the conflict has done so. The determinative issue would be the degree 
of nexus between the group’s actions occurring in the neighboring State 
and ongoing NIAC.48 
 
C. Geographically Unfocused Conflicts  
 
Situations in which the hostilities in question are not centered in a particu-
lar area pose the most complex legal geography issues. Arguments suggest-
                                                                                                                      
46. See, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note 10, arts. 47–78. 
47. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE 
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 50 (Jean 
Pictet ed., 1952). 
48. Claus Kress has noted that the geographical extension of a NIAC “can only be 
envisaged if the non-State party has established an actual (quasi-) military infrastructure on 
the territory of the third State’s soil that would enable the non-State party to carry out 
intensive violence also from there.” Kress, supra note 8, at 266. The author agrees that this 
situation would be a sufficient, but not a necessary, ground for extension. 
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ing the existence of a “global war on terror” in which the United States is 
party to an armed conflict with transnational terrorism writ large compli-
cated legal discourse in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Fortunately, they 
have lost credibility. 49 Instead, most IHL experts now classify the legal 
state of affairs using mainstream yardsticks. In particular, those who sup-
port the possibility of non-geographically focused NIACs, including the 
author, typically evaluate conflicts with transnational organized armed 
groups on a case-by-case basis by applying the intensity and organization 
criteria.50 In this approach, the activities of organized armed groups may 
only be combined to satisfy the intensity criterion when the groups con-
cerned can reasonably be characterized as a single coherent organization 
operating collaboratively. 
This view obviously necessitates interpretation of Common Article 3’s 
“in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties” text as referring to 
any State, not just the State that is party to the conflict. For its advocates, 
the nature of the parties, rather than the hostilities’ territoriality, regulates 
whether a conflict falls within the ambit of an armed conflict such that IHL 
applies.51 They point out that Common Article 3, unlike Additional Proto-
col I, governs NIACs irrespective of whether the organized armed group 
exercises any territorial control. The fact that Additional Protocol II ex-
pressly frames applicability geographically while Common Article 3 is silent 
on the issue infers, in their view, the absence of a geographical limitation 
                                                                                                                      
49. Soon after the 9/11 attacks, the ICRC argued that classification of conflict with 
transnational terrorists depends on a “case-by-case” analysis applying traditional criteria. 
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OFF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS, 28th Internation-
al Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 03/IC/09, 17–19 (2003). See also Jelena 
Pejic, Armed Conflict and Terrorism—There is a (Big) Difference, in COUNTERTERRORISM 171, 
201–02 (Ana María Salinas de Frías, Katja L.H. Samuel, & Nigel D. White eds., 2012). The 
author agrees with this position. 
50. See also, e.g., Noam Lubell, The War(?) against Al-Qaeda, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, supra note 41, at 421, 434–37. 
51. This is the position adopted by the Obama administration. John O. Brennan, As-
sistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Pro-
gram on Law and Security, Harvard Law School: Strengthening Our Security by Adhering 
to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-
values-an. It should be noted, however, that the administration has placed policy (vice 
legal) restrictions on where operations may be conducted. White House, Fact Sheet, supra 
note 22. 
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vis-à-vis the latter; after all, Additional Protocol II conflicts are but a subcat-
egory of Common Article 3 NIACs.  
Moreover, the text of the article does not foreclose extraterritorial ap-
plicability. On the contrary, its prohibitions apply “at any time and in any 
place whatsoever with respect to [protected] persons.”52 Although that 
clause does not definitely answer the territoriality question, it does suggest 
that the article’s protections are to be construed liberally.53 As Professor 
Marco Sassòli has perceptively noted, “[i]f such wording meant that con-
flicts opposing states and organized armed groups and spreading over the 
territory of several states were not ‘non-international armed conflicts’, there 
would be a gap in protection, which could not be explained by states’ con-
cerns about their sovereignty.”54 Along this same line, in Nicaragua the In-
ternational Court of Justice looked back to its first case, Corfu Channel, 
when characterizing Common Article 3 as reflective of “elementary consid-
erations of humanity.”55 In doing so, it unambiguously emphasized the cen-
trality of its protections in all conflicts.  
Like the Supreme Court in Hamdan, advocates of the view advance a 
binary construct, the central premise of which is that because conflicts be-
tween States are international in character, all others are, drawing directly 
on the text of Common Article 3, “not of an international character” (as 
distinct from the vaguer moniker “non-international armed conflict”). The 
hostilities must, of course, satisfy the intensity requirement and the group 
concerned must exhibit sufficient organization, but once these two condi-
tions are satisfied, IHL governs all conflict-related activities. These include, 
inter alia, targeting, detention, and the protection of civilians and civilian 
objects. For those, such as the author, who contend that IHRL continues 
                                                                                                                      
52. Geneva Conventions I–IV, supra note 10, art. 3. 
53. Nils Melzer notes that an original formulation of Common Article 3 referred to 
conflict that occurred “in the territory of one or more of the High Contracting Parties,” 
but suggests that its absence in the final draft should not be interpreted as a desire to ex-
clude such applicability. MELZER, supra note 32, at 258 n.83. See also the discussion of the 
drafting history in SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 36, at 229–30. 
54. Marco Sassòli, Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law 9, 6 
HPCR OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES (Winter 2006), http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/ 
default/files/publications/OccasionalPaper6.pdf.  
55. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 218 (June 27), referring to Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Dec. 
19). Jelena Pejic has suggested that the characterization, in part, justifies the extension of 
IHL to spillover conflicts. Pejic, Status of Armed Conflicts, supra note 9, at 87. 
 
 
 
Charting the Legal Geography of NIAC Vol. 90 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to apply in an armed conflict subject to the lex specialis of IHL, operations 
would also be constrained to an extent by the former. 
The ICRC has rejected “the notion that a person ‘carries’ a NIAC with 
him to the territory of a nonbelligerent state” on the basis that “[i]t would 
have the effect of potentially expanding the application of rules on the 
conduct of hostilities to multiple states according to a person’s movement 
around the world as long as he is directly participating in hostilities in rela-
tion to a specific NIAC.”56 In other words, such an approach would “mean 
recognition of the concept of a ‘global battlefield.’”57 As the organization 
fairly points out, the classification of conflict paradigm would have signifi-
cant consequences for civilians and civilian objects in a State that is not a 
party to the conflict, but in which conflict related activities occurred. For 
example, collateral damage during attacks against military objectives, mem-
bers of a party’s “armed forces,” or individuals directly participating in hos-
tilities would not violate international law unless it ran afoul of the exces-
siveness test set forth in the rule of proportionality or resulted from a fail-
ure to take feasible precautions in attack.58 The ICRC therefore suggests 
that such operations should be assessed “pursuant to the rules on law en-
forcement.”59 
This is a reasonable position, one meriting careful consideration. How-
ever, the alternative view, by which IHL is unconstrained territorially, is 
arguably more consistent with traditional understandings of the lex lata and 
better suited to the realities of modern conflict. For instance, it is, as dis-
cussed, well-settled that IHL applies throughout the territory of parties to a 
NIAC irrespective of where the hostilities are underway (or likely to occur). 
It is unclear why, as a matter of law, the logic which underpins the applica-
bility of IHL in peaceful areas inside a State would not equally apply be-
yond its borders, such as regions outside the area of spillover conflict.60  
The case of State intervention on behalf of the government in a NIAC 
reveals similar incongruence. Recall that IHL applies throughout the terri-
tory of all States that are party to a NIAC irrespective of whether hostilities 
                                                                                                                      
56. ICRC 31st Conference Report, supra note 3, at 22. 
57. Id. 
58. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, arts. 51 & 57. Note that these rules are gener-
ally deemed applicable in non-international armed conflict. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATION-
AL HUMANITARIAN LAW chs. 4 & 5 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 
2005). 
59. ICRC 31st Conference Report, supra note 3, at 22. 
60. For an interesting piece arguing for a “zone of hostilities” approach that is based 
in part on this paradoxical possibility, see generally Daskal, supra note 8. 
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are occurring in the location concerned; IHL applicability in a particular 
area (in this case the intervener’s territory) depends on party status, not the 
geography of activities associated with the conflict. Bearing this in mind, 
take the Afghan conflict as an example of the resulting paradox if IHL 
does not follow the parties. Nearly fifty nations presently contribute troops 
to the International Security Assistance Force.61 They range from Belgium 
and Denmark to Mongolia and Tonga. Since all such States are party to 
Afghanistan’s NIAC, IHL applies throughout their territories, even though 
no conflict related hostilities are taking place there. With respect to the ge-
ographic scope of IHL, it is not apparent why, for example, it should be 
lawful to target a Danish soldier in Copenhagen based on status alone, but 
not a member of the Taliban who had found his way to, say, a remote area 
of Turkmenistan.  
Both cases illustrate that it is not the intensity of individual operations 
or the locus of hostilities that matter when determining whether IHL is 
applicable in a certain area. Rather, the existence of a NIAC in a location, 
and therefore the applicability of IHL to operations occurring there, de-
pend on 1) the involvement of qualifying parties, and 2) sufficient intensity 
with respect to the conflict as a whole. Neither ongoing hostilities with a 
nexus to the conflict at the specific location in question nor proximity to 
the borders of the State involved in the NIAC constitute conditions prece-
dent to IHL applicability. 
A geographically focused approach might make sense if IHL’s applica-
bility was “border-based,” that is, strictly limited to the territories of those 
States qualifying as parties to the conflict. Such a rule, particularly in a con-
sent-based treaty environment, would reflect sensitivity to the interests of 
States that are not participating in the conflict, much as the law of interna-
tional armed conflict takes cognizance of the interests of neutrals. Yet, the 
ICRC clearly and sensibly has rejected such formalistic line drawing in the 
context of spillover conflicts on the basis that it might deprive civilians of 
protections.62 The reasoning underpinning that argument is no less compel-
ling with respect to civilians and those who fall into enemy hands beyond 
the area of spillover. After all, if IHL did not apply in the spillover area, 
international human rights norms would govern the operations. If IHRL 
                                                                                                                      
61.NATO, International Security Assistance Force, Key Facts and Figures, 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/2013-12-01%20ISAF%20Placemat-
final.pdf (last visited Dec. 24, 2013). 
62. ICRC 31st Conference Report, supra note 3, at 10. 
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does not afford sufficient protection in a spillover conflict, it is not obvious 
why it would do so elsewhere. 
Concern about a “global battlefield” also stems in part from fear that a 
non-geographically focused IHL paradigm would spread hostilities and 
their effects widely since targeting could, in part, be status-based and be-
cause IHL instead of IHRL proportionality norms would govern attacks. 
Many of those who have expressed this fear, albeit not the ICRC, miss the 
fact that the jus ad bellum already serves as a rigid constraint on the range of 
the conflict. In particular, even when an individual may lawfully be targeted 
under IHL, a separate legal basis to cross the border of the State into which 
the operation is to be mounted must exist (the two most likely being con-
sent and self-defense). Absent such a normative justification, operations 
that would be lawful under IHL may well be precluded because the forces 
necessary to conduct them cannot lawfully get to their target. While this 
point should not be exaggerated, for there is no doubt that the nonrestric-
tive approach to geographic applicability results in a more permissive tar-
geting environment, concerns as to an unconstrained spread of hostilities 
should be assuaged in part by the effect of legal norms lying outside IHL. 
The changing nature of conflict likewise augurs against a geographically 
restrictive application of IHL. Two aspects of twenty-first century conflict 
are particularly noteworthy in this regard. First, organized armed groups 
have increasingly exploited territoriality in order to shelter operations from 
counterattacks. It is now common for such organizations to establish base 
camps in other States for training and logistical purposes, especially when 
the areas in which they operate are located in States that lack the ability or 
will to exercise control over those activities. Moreover, their members of-
ten operate abroad to frustrate attempts by States involved in the NIAC to 
identify and locate them. This propensity is in direct relation to the degree 
of military advantage enjoyed by the State’s forces, for asymmetry tends to 
drive organized armed groups away from the conventional battlefield. The 
same dynamic will incentivize their exploitation of any geographical limita-
tions to the applicability of IHL as a means of shielding themselves from 
its more robust targeting regime. 
Second, organized armed groups can be expected to increasingly turn 
to cyber attacks as a means of striking at their asymmetrically advantaged 
government opponents.63 Since such attacks may be launched from any 
                                                                                                                      
63. On the classification of cyber conflicts, see Michael N. Schmitt, Classification of 
Cyber Conflict, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 233–51 (2013). 
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location offering connectivity to the target system, the groups are likely to 
situate themselves far from the conventional battlefield. In particular, the 
fact that their State opponent will generally lack control over cyber infra-
structure located in other States will render the conduct of cyber operations 
from those States especially appealing.  
Such factors will likely motivate States involved in these conflicts to 
adopt expansive interpretations of IHL’s geographical scope. This is par-
ticularly so in light of the fact that the intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance capabilities of States are improving dramatically, resulting in 
commensurate enhancement of their ability to identify and locate their 
non-State opponents. As this trend continues, States will logically seek to 
leverage their newfound resources to strike the enemy whenever and wher-
ever the opportunity presents itself. The growing use of armed drones by 
the United States and other nations to conduct attacks far from the con-
ventional battle lines is apt illustration of this likelihood. 
 
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
Today, it appears clear that IHL applies throughout the territory of any 
State that is party to a NIAC, as well as in border areas of neighboring 
States into which a conflict has spilled over. IHL also governs operations in 
States not party to the conflict when the intensity and organization criteria 
are satisfied within that State during a conflict between an organized armed 
group and another State’s forces. But does IHL apply beyond such loca-
tions? The interpretive dilemma is that, on the one hand, a broad approach 
to applicability extends the protections of IHL in a positive fashion. How-
ever, on the other, the fact that IHL is lex specialis limits IHRL’s restrictive 
effect on the conduct of hostilities, thereby expanding the “battle space.”  
How States will resolve this inherent tension remains to be seen. A 
State’s national interests always influence its interpretation of international 
law; nowhere is this more so than with respect to IHL’s grey areas, for is-
sues of conflict by definition involve vital national interests. In particular, 
such interests will influence how States balance military necessity (the need 
to be able to fight effectively) against humanitarian considerations (the de-
sire of States to limits the deleterious consequences of war, both in a gen-
eral sense and vis-à-vis their soldiers, civilians, and civilian property), a bal-
ancing that underpins every aspect of IHL.  
As it stands now, the geographically unrestricted approach tracks the 
traditional emphasis on party status as the decisive determinant to IHL ap-
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plicability. This is not to say that the restricted approach that extends ap-
plicability only to spillover conflicts is insensible; on the contrary, a reason-
able argument can be made that such an interpretation accords with the 
object and purpose of IHL. However, this author is of the view that object 
and purpose can just as reasonably undergird the unrestricted position.  
Moreover, the influence contemporary and future conflict modalities 
will exert on State interpretation, and therefore State practice and opinio ju-
ris, is likely to operate against restrictive approaches; narrow interpretations 
will be seen by States facing such threats as contrary to their national inter-
ests. Indeed, the willingness of certain influential IHL actors, most notably 
the ICRC, to broaden the notion of geographical scope to spillover con-
flicts signals recognition of the reality that States involved in such conflicts 
will not countenance treating the operations of their non-State opponents 
as immune from the more robust response options envisioned in IHL once 
they cross borders. This article has suggested that the most defensible view 
from the perspective of both classic party-based conflict classification crite-
ria and the emerging realities of modern conflict is that IHL applicability in 
NIACs is unconstrained geographically, with the critical caveat that other 
bodies of international law may well limit where operations attendant to 
such conflict may be conducted. 
 
